Fred O. Wold v. Ogden City et al : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Fred O. Wold v. Ogden City et al : Brief of
Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Young, Thatcher & Glasmann; Paul Thatcher; Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wold v. Ogden City, No. 7927 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1856
Case No. 7927 




STATE OF UTAH 
Fl LF. D 
FRED 0. WOLD, tv1.~K ~ - 1~ 5 
Plaintiff and ---------------·~-_,....,.,.. ... _ 
Appellant, Clerk. Supreme Cv · ,. . Utah 
-vs.-
OGDEN CITY, a Muni~ipal Corpo-
ration, and WHEELWRIGHT 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
OF OGDEN, UTAH, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
PAUL THATCHER 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
.• WOODY PIIINTINii CO.,OIDIN, UTAN J 0 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEThiENT OF POINTS ---------------------------------------------- 4 
ARGUThiENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
Point 1. The burden is on Appellant to show 
that the order of dismissal is erroneous, and 
as he has argued only one of four grounds on 
which the order was based, he has waived the 
other three, and the order must be sustained 
on those grounds, which are presumed to be 
sufficient -----------------------············-··················-··················· 5 
Point 2. The facts stated do not show any negli-
gence by either defendant, or that either 
violated any duty owing to plaintiff ........................ 10 
Point 3. The alleged negligence of the defend-
ants was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries -----------·····························-----------·······------------------17 
Point 4. The stated facts affirmatively show 
that plaintiff voluntarily attempted to cross 
the trench in the face of dangers of which he 
knew or should have known, and assumed the 
risk of injury therefrom within the meaning 
of the doctrine "volenti non fit injuria." ................ 21 
Point 5. The stated facts affirmatively show 
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence ····························--·-----·-··············-·····---···-·······30 
Point 6. The dismissal of Appellant's cause 
does not deprive him of his constitutional 
right of jury trial as the stated facts present 
no claim on which relief could be granted .............. 34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  





Buckingham vs. Commary-Peterson Company 178 
Pac. 318 (California District Court of Appeal, 
Rehearing Denied by Supreme Court February 
10, 1919) ------------------------------------------------------------------------27' 31 
City of Glendale vs. Sutter 95 Pac. 2nd 560 --------------------31 
Cody vs. Boston 154 N. E. 753 --------------------------------------------30 
Compton vs. Revere 179 Mass. 413 ; 60 N. E. 931 ____________ 28 
Dingman vs. A. F. Mattock 96 Pac. 2nd 821; 104 
Pac.· 2nd 26 ---------------------------------·-·····----------------------------------24 
Engel vs. Boston Ice Company 4 N. E. 2nd 455 ____________ 25 
Gowing vs. Henry Field Company 281 N. W. 281 __________ 24 
Hall vs. Ziegler 64 Atl. 2nd 767 --------------·····--····---------------26 
Herndon vs. Salt Lake City 34 Utah 65; 95 Pac. 646 ........ 15 
Jensen vs. Logan City 89 Utah 347; 57 Pac. 2nd 708 ........ 16 
Knox vs. Snow 229 Pac. 2nd 87 4 ------------------------·--·-·-·------31 
LaPorte vs. Houston 189 Pac. 2nd 544 ----------------------23, 26 
Lewis vs. Standard Oil Company of California 
88 F~d. 2nd 512 "-·--------------·---------------------------------------------··- 6 
Lineburg vs~ St. Paul 71 Minn. 245; 73 N. W. 723 .......... 13 
McCarthy vs. Boston 266 Mass. 262; 165 N. E. 123 .......... 13 
Mathewson vs. First Security Trust Company of 
St. Joseph, Missouri 100 Fed. 2nd 121 ····-·······-··-····---- 6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Morris vs. Salt Lake City 35 Utah 474; 101 Pac. 
373 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.17 
Niblock vs. Salt Lake City 100 Utah 573; 111 Pac. 
2nd 800 ------------ __ .. ___________ -------------------------------------------.......... 12 
Nielsen vs. Christensen-Gardiner 85 Utah 79; 38 
Pac. 2nd 7 ±3 ----------------------------------------------------------------------12 
Palfreyman vs. Bates and Rogers Construction 
Company 108 Utah 142; 158 Pac. 2nd 132, 133; 
Syllabus No. 2 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6 
Parry vs. Harris 93 Utah 317; 72 Pac. 2nd 1044 
Syllabus No. 9 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6 
In re: Pichard's Estate 42 Utah 105; 129 Pac. 353, 
356 ----------------------.. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Raymond vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company 
113 Utah 26; 191 Pac. 2nd 137 ----------------------------------------34 
Regenbogen vs. Southern Shipwrecking Corpora-
tion 41 Southern 2nd 110 ------------------------------------------------25 
Reid vs. Anderson 116 Utah 455 ; 211 Pac. 2nd 
206, 208 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------8-10 
Shriver vs. Marion County Court 66 S. E. 1062; 
26 LRA (N. S.) 377 -----------~--------------------------------------------29 
Southern Pacific Company vs. McCready 4 7 Fed. 
2nd 673, 67 6 -----------------------------------------------------·--·····-····--·--23 
Swift & Company vs. Schuster 192 Fed. 2nd 615 ............ 22 
Walsh vs. West Coast Mines (Washington, 1948) 
197 Pac. 2nd 233 .................................................................. 22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Legal Encyclopedias Cited 
American Law Institute Restatement of the Law 
of Torts, Volume 2, Page 1243 ---------------------------------------.33 
65 CJS, Page 685 ····--·-····-·············-·--------··-···························18 
65 CJS, Page 693 ----·····-······················--···-·--·························18 
Volume 65 Harvard Law Review, Page 623 ................ 22 
11 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., 
, Section 30.203, p. 170 Note 13, and cases cited ............ 11 
19 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., 
Section 54.98, Page 357, Note 84 ····---·························----14 
19 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., 
Section 54.99, Page 360, Note 95 -·-···························------13 
19 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., 
Section 54.102 ······-··················--·····----·····-··························17 
44 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, 368, 
et seq. ·················-················---·-·······································-···21 
Rules, Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 75(p) (2) ............ 7 
Section 34-4-1, U. C. A. 1953 ............................................ 3 
Constitution of Utah Article I, Section 10 .................... 34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




OGDEN CITY, a Municipal Corpo-
ration, and WHEELWRIGHT 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
OF OGDEN, UTAH, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While appellant's statement of facts is accurate in 
most particulars, it is incorrect in several matters which 
are very material. We shall consider these briefly. 
First, appellant, on page two of his brief says, 
"The trench extended from Grant A venue to Washington 
Avenue ... " ~his is not in accord either with the 
facts or the statement thereof before the trial Court. 
The statement on which the Court ruled was "Our 
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evidence will show there was an alleyway up from near 
the edge of Washington A venue, and the trench was 
constructed that way on that evening." (T. 2). The 
eastern limit of the trench was at the alleyway, not at 
Washington Avenue. 
Second, on page two of his brief appellant says, 
"The trench had been dug while appellant was at work 
during the day of June 25th. Appellant had had no 
opportunity to examine it in the daylight prior to his 
injury." But on the contrary, the appellant did have 
full opportunity to examine the trench in daylight. The 
opening statement says, "That would be the afternoon 
or evening of the 25th of June. Mr. Wold carne home 
that afternoon at about four o'clock. He noticed that 
they were constructing a trench in the street there on 
18th Street. I drew a rough sketch, Lady and Gentle-
men, and for the purpose of showing what I have to 
show, I will indicate without drawing any more lines on 
the board, as he came horne, the Miller residence, where 
he resided, is located here. (Indicating the area on the 
North side of 18th Street immediately West of the 
Northerly projection of the West line of Kiesel A venue.) 
.... Mr. Wold stopped his car here, (Indicating the 
South side of 18th Street, just east of Kiesel. See 
chalk mark on sketch.) and at that time he noticed the 
construction work going on on this trench. Just exactly 
where the trench was at that time I think Mr. Wold was 
unable to tell it, but at any rate he went into the Miller 
house, changed his clothes and went back downtown to 
meet Mrs. Wold." ( T. 2.) 
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Even if ~Ir. Wold could not tell just how near to 
\Vashington BouleYard the trench had progressed at 
four o'clock P. ~I., which is within one hour of quitting 
tin1e on public works contracts (see Section 34-4-1, U. C. 
A. 1953), it is a clear and necessary inference from the 
facts stated that it was substantially past the Miller 
house, which was just less than half way along the block. 
As the trench was at the alleyway "near" Washington 
Boulevard within the hour, it clearly was past the point 
where he later attempted to cross it. We doubt that 
Counsel for Appellant will contend that Mr. Wold did 
not in fact twice cross the "trench at about that point 
that afternoon. We respectfully invite the Appellant to 
admit that as a fact for the purpose of this Appeal, so 
that this matter may be fully considered in accord with 
the spirit of the new Rules of Procedure. It is believed 
there is really no question as to the actual fact. 
Third, the appellant neglected to refer in his state-
ment of facts to that portion of the opening statement 
in which he told of a crossing of the trench provided 
betwe.en Grant and Kiesel A venues. It was there said, 
"He (Mr. Wold) noticed the trench went out on the 
edge of the street there (at 18th Street and Grant 
Avenue), and there was a small flare-pot on the street 
on Grant Avenue and going along the trench and going 
up to the Miller hpme to the driveway, the area west of 
the driveway, there was a place for people to go in on 
the street but way below the Miller property." (T. 3.) 
Of course, it is only half a city block from Grant to 
Kiesel, so "way below" must have been something less 
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than that distance. At any rate Appellant's statement 
shows his allegation of failure to provide crossings is 
not true, even if relevant and material, which it is not. 
Finally, Appellant's statement in his brief (p. 4) 
that "The basis of the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint 
was that . appellant was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law in attempting to cross the trench and 
enter his residence on 18th Street," is only about one-
fourth of the truth. Defendant's motions to dismiss 
were made, and granted, on four separate grounds: 
1. The facts stated fail to disclose any negligence 
by either defendant, or the violation by either of any 
duty owed to plaintiff. 
2. 'The stated facts affirmatively show that plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 
3. The stated facts affirmatively show that defen-
dant voluntarily attempted to cross in the face of dangers 
of which he knew or should have known, and therefore 
assumed the risk of such injury within the meaning of 
the doctrine "volenti non fit injuria." 
4. The alleged negligent acts or omissions of the 
defendants, if any there were, were not the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
· See Transcript,. pp. 7 to 10. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point 1. The burden is on Appellent to show that 
the order of dismissal is erroneous, and as he 
has argued only one of four grounds on which 
the order was based, he has waived the other 
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three, and the order must be sustained on those 
grounds, which are presumed to be sufficient. 
Point 2. The facts stated do not show any negli-
gence by either defendant, or that either 
violated any duty owing to plaintiff. 
Point 3. The alleged negligence of the defendants 
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries. 
Point 4. The stated facts affirmatively show that 
plaintiff voluntarily attempted to cross the 
trench in the face of dangers of which he knew 
or should have known, and assumed the risk 
of injury therefrom within the meaning of the. 
doctrine "volenti non fit injuria." 
Point 5. The stated facts affirmatively show 
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
Point 6. The dismissal of Appellant's cause does 
not deprive him of his constitutional right of 
jury trial as the stated facts present no claim 
on which relief could be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. The burden is on Appellant to show 
that the order of dismissal is erroneous, and as he has 
argued only one of four grounds on which the order 
was based, he has waived the other three, and the order 
must be sustained on those grounds, which are presumed 
to be sufficient. 
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·The decisions of this court have long since settled 
beyond any peradventure of a doubt that there is a 
presumption that the judgment of the Trial Court was 
correct, and that every reasonable intendment must be 
indulged in favor of it, and that the burden of affirma-
tively showing error is on the party complaining thereof, 
that is, upon the Appellant here. 
Palfreyman vs. Bates and Rogers 
Construction Company 
108 Utah 142; 158 Pac. 2nd 132, 133, Syllabus 
No.2, 
and cases there cited. 
It is equally well settled in Utah that points of law 
or fact, or assignments of error are deemed to be 
waived unless presented and argued in the brief of the 
Appellant. See 
Parry vs. Harris 
93 Utah 317, 
72 Pac. 2nd 1044 Syllabus No. 9 
and the authorities there referred to. 
The same rule is applied in the Federal Courts 
from which our present Rules of Procedure have been 
borrowed. 
and 
Mathewson vs. First Trust Company of St. 
Joseph, Missouri 
100 Fed. 2nd 121, 
Lewis vs. Standard Oil Company of 
California 
88 Fed. 2nd 512. 
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nioreover, the present Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 75(p) (2), specifically require the Appel-
lant's brief to include a concise statement of the points 
upon which the Appellant intends to rely for a reversal 
with an argument of each of such points. 
In this case, as shown by the transcript of the 
proceedings, pages 7 to 10, the motions for dismissal 
were each made upon four separate grounds and the 
court granted the motions without stating that the order 
was based upon less than all of the grounds. Pre-
sumptively therefore the court based its dismissal upon 
all four grounds. The Appellant here has argued only 
the single point of contributory negligence and has 
wholly and utterly failed to make any argument what-
soever as to the other grounds of lack of negligence on 
the defendants, assumption of risk and lack of a proxi-
mate casual relation between the alleged negligence 
and plaintiff's injuries. Under these circumstances the 
Appellant has waived and abandoned any claim of error 
which might have been based upon the entry of an order 
of dismissal based on these three specified grounds. 
Since no attempt has been made by Appellant to show 
that the court erred in entering the order of dismissal 
upon these three grounds, and thus is deemed to have 
waived any objection on this basis, the effect of the 
waiver is to withdraw any such claimed error from the 
court's consideration, and thus to sustain the ruling of 
the Trial Court. It follows, therefore, that the ruling 
of the Trial Court in granting the motions for dismissal 
based upon these three grounds not argued in Appel-
lant's brief is in effect sustained. Inasmuch as the 
order must be considered validly entered upon each 
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of these three grounds, it really becomes unnecessary 
to consider the single point of contributory negligence 
upon which the appellant has seen fit to argue in his 
brief. 
The case of 
In re: Pichard's Estate 
42 Utah 105; 129 Pac. 343, 356, 
is in point and supports the position taken by respon-
dents here. This court there held that where there may 
have been several reasons for the ruling of the Trial 
Court below, and its reasons do not appear, and the 
appellant fails to point out where the ruling was in 
error, the Supreme Court will assume the reasons are 
valid and will not search the record for possible error. 
Again the case of 
Reid vs. Anderson 
116 Utah 455 
211 Pac. 2nd 206, 208, 
is exactly in point and when considered in connection 
with the Pichard case, supra, is determinative of the 
case at Bar. In that case the Trial Court dismissed an 
action when a plaintiff refused to plead over after a 
demurrer made on four separate grounds had been 
sustained. In that case the plaintiff-appellant argued 
in his brief two of the four grounds on which the 
demurrer had been sustained but completely neglected 
to argue the other two grounds. This court, with Mr. 
Justice Wolfe writing the opinion, and with Chief Justice 
Pratt and Justices Wade and McDonough concurring, 
held that in failing to argue these two points the appel-
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lant had waived them and that this had the effect of 
leaving the order of dismissal adequately supported by 
at least two grounds which were not under attack and 
that therefore the order of dismissal must be affirmed. 
The language there used by the court is so clear and 
logical we cannot forebear to quote from it briefly: 
""Plaintiffs have argued at some length the 
sufficiency of the facts alleged in their complaint 
to state a cause of action, and they have also 
argued the question of misjoinder of parties 
defendant. But they have wholly and utterly 
failed to make any argument whatsoever as to 
the other two grounds upon which the demurrer 
was sustained. It is a rule oft reiterated by 
this court, and apparently unheeded by a sub-
stantial portion of the bar, that assignments 
of error not argued in the printed briefs are 
deemed waived. Counsel who asserts error has 
the burden of showing that error exists. It 
is not our duty to search the record in quest for 
error. The rules of this court requiring appell-
ant to set forth assignments of error and to file 
printed briefs are based on sound policy of 
the law. 
"Since no attempt has been made by counsel 
for appellants to show that the court erred in 
sustaining the demurrers for uncertainty, and 
for improperly uniting causes of action without 
separately stating them, any assignment of error 
as to those rulings is deemed waived. The effect 
of a waiver of an assignment of error is to with-
draw such assignment of error from our consi-
deration and thus to sustain the ruling of the 
trial court. It follows, therefore, that the ruling 
of the trial court as to the two grounds of de-
murrer not argued is, in effect, sustained. That 
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is determinative of the case as against the Ander-
sons and it becomes unnecessary to consider 
whether the court erred in sustaining on· the two 
grounds which have been argued." 
It is respectfully submitted that the matters above 
considered dispose of the case at Bar and require the 
affirmance of the jugment below. In such event is should 
not be necessary for the court to proceed to a considera-
tion of the other matters hereinafter discussed. How-
ever, out of an abundance of caution we shall now pro-
ceed to show that these other points which might have 
been raised by the appellant had he considered them to 
be potentially fruitful, are without merit. In so doing 
the Respondents do not waive the points hereinbefore 
developed. 
POINT 2. The facts stated do not show any negli-
gence by either defendant, or that either violated any 
duty owing to plaintiff. 
It is admitted by the pleadings that the trench in 
question was constructed and the dirt therefrom piled 
on the South side thereof by Wheelwright Construction 
Company under contract with Ogden City. The nature 
of the trench and its relation to the pile of dirt is 
rather clearly shown in Plaintiff's E~ibit A, which 
was made a part of the statement. It is obvious that 
the trench was dug for the laying of pipe in connection 
with some public work not identified in the record. 
According to Appellant's opening statement, when 
he came home from the party that night he "turned in 
here on Grant Avenue. He noticed the trench went out 
on the edge of the street there, and there was a small 
10 
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flare-pot on the street on Grant Avenue ... and going 
up to the :Miller home to the driveway, the area west 
of the driveway there was a place for people to go in on 
the street but way below the Miller property. We speak 
of it as being a high trench or pile of dirt with no open-
ings through it to get to the Miller place." (T. 3). After 
parking his car ··~Ir. Wold asked Mrs. Wold to waita 
minute. He climbed up over the bank and decided he 
could safely cross. He got down on the edge of the 
bank, placed one foot on the edge of the trench, . . . . 
and had his other foot across on the other side of the 
trench, straddling it, so he could help Mrs. Wold across, 
when the foot he placed first collapsed under him, the 
bank giving out from under his foot." He fell. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The negligence alleged in the complaint, and stated 
in appellant's opening statement consisted of only two 
items: (1) That defendants failed to prepare an 
opening through the dirt pile and a crossing of the 
trench at appellant's home at 336 -18th Street; and (2} 
that there was no adequate or sufficient lighting in the 
vicinity of 336- 18th Street by which persons could 
guide themselves and cross over the dirt pile and trench. 
(Complaint, paragraph IV; T 2, 3.) 
"That a municipality may temporarily close a street, 
where necessary so to do for a reasonable time, is well 
settled. Thus a city may close a street pending construc-
tion work." 
11 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 
3rd Ed., Section 30.203, p. 170, Note 13, 
and cases cited. 
11 
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, If the street becomes defective in the course of 
public works, the only duty of the city or its contractor 
is to erect adequate barriers or warnings. This Court 
has recognized that rule in the case of 
Niblock vs. Salt Lake City 
100 Utah 573; 111 Pac. 2nd 800, 
where the Court, speaking through Justice McDonough, 
said, in discussing the statute underwhich municipal 
liability is postulated: 
" 'Such street' has reference to a street in 
a defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed 
condition. The liability in any case would be 
based on negligence. The obstructed condition 
of a street gives rise to no liability if the city 
has taken proper precautions. The erection of 
adequate barriers and warnings would usually 
fulfill the city's duty to the traveling public 
though the street be defective." 
That the same rule applies to contractors on public 
works, such as the Wheelwright Construction Company 
here, was held by this Court in 
Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardiner 
85 Utah 79; 38 Pac. 2nd 743. 
There it was held that the erection by the contractor 
of an adequate barrier on a street under construction 
discharged the contractor's duty to the traveling public. 
Again, it is the law that where the nature of the 
work in progress is such that it is itself sufficient notice 
of the dangerous condition of the street, no artificial 
barriers are necessary. 
12 
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McCarthy v. Boston 
266 1fass. 262; 165 N. E. 123. 
The only thing that is necessary is that the means 
employed shall be "reasonably sufficient" to warn the 
traveling public of the presence of the obstruction or 
defect. 
19 1\fcQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 
3rd Ed., Section 54.99, P. 360, Note 95. 
Nor is it necessary that the barricade be such that it 
cannot be surmounted or penetrated. 
Lineburg v. St. Paul 
71 Minn. 245; 73 N. W. 723. 
In the case at bar, the pile of dirt south of the 
trench, with a flare-pot at the end thereof was an 
adequate barrier. It clearly served the purpose for 
which it was intended, the appellant saw it, and it 
brought home to him the fact of the existence of the 
trench. It was in fact "reasonably sufficient" to warn, 
and it did warn him of the condition of the street. That 
is all the law requires of the people of the city and their 
contractor. 
But it is interesting to note that appellant does not 
here complain of failure to barricade or warn him of the 
danger-he complains that the defendants were wrong 
in erecting the barricade over which he scrambled to 
get at the point of danger! He asserts that the pile 
should have been opened to him exactly at his driveway 
at 336 -18th Street, and the trench there bridged to 
enable him to use that portion of the street as freely as 
if no public works were in progress, as freely as if that 
13 
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portion of the street had not been temporarily closed to 
travel in the interest of safety and the common welfare. 
That, of course, is absurd. The city had the right to 
close that portion of the street for a reasonable time. 
If appellant had the right to insist on the uninterrupted 
use of the portion of the street in front of his residence, 
so had every other resident of the City, and the City's 
right to temporarily close the street has disappeared. 
The expense of performing public works on the public 
streets would be prohibitive. Indeed, if the public 
cannot require a resident to detour for a few yards 
around a public works project, public works become 
impossible, for they could not be pursued without a 
violation of law. As we say, that is absurd. 
Moreover, the rule is exactly contrary to that con-
tended for by Appellant. As said in 
19 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 
3rd Ed., Section 54.98, page 357, Note 84, 
"Moreover, if necessary to prevent accidents, 
a municipality not only may but it is its duty to 
close the street to the public by some barrier." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
What could have been more dangerous than to 
leave an opening without any barricade, and with some 
necessarily cheap and makeshift bridge' Such a situa-
tion would indeed have been an open invitation to 
accident! 
The City and the contractor here followed the only 
reasonable course. They have not violated any duty, 
and were not negligent under the facts stated. The 
dismissal must be affirmed on this ground. 
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The second complaint made by the appellant was 
that the defendants failed to provide sufficient lighting 
to light the appellant safely across the barrier and 
trench, that is across the closed portion of the street. 
It is subn1itted that neither defendant had any duty 
to maintain any right to enable the appellant to cross 
the closed portion of the street. In general, there is no 
duty on any Inunicipality to light its streets. 
Herndon vs. Salt Lake City 
34 Utah 65 ; 95 Pac. 646. 
It follows a fortiori that there is no general duty on a 
private corporation or citizen to light the public streets. 
Moreover, it is not ordinarily the duty of the city 
to place lights or warning signals, or to put up barriers 
along the margins of its streets, or to mark or define the 
wrought or travelled portions of them. "These are re-
quired only to point out obstructions or excavations in 
the travelled part of the street, or, where the whole 
street is open, to point out where they are so that they 
may be avoided." Herndon vs. Salt Lake City, supra. 
In this case it is clear from the pleadings and from 
the opening statement of the appellant that the excava-
tion and obstruction of which he complained was "pointed 
out" to him and he knew of its existence. From the 
comment in the opening statement that the appell~nt 
"looked the situation over" and scrambled up over the 
dirt barrier and straddled the trench, it is obvious that 
there was sufficient lighting to enable him to know of 
the existence of the obstruction and excavation. That 
was all that was required. From that point on he was 
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on his own and if he was injured, it was the result of 
his own fool hardiness in proceeding in the face of a 
known danger. The purpose of special lighting had 
already been accomplished and it is obvious that no 
additional lighting was called for. In failing to provide 
it the defendants were not negligent. 
There is an additional reason for holding that the 
defendant Ogden City was not negligent in this case. 
It is admitted by the pleadings that the defendant Wheel-
wright Construction Company constructed the trench in 
question. There is nothing in the opening statement to 
show that Ogden City had either actual or constructive 
notice of the defect or defects in 18th Street, of which 
the plaintiff complains, nor does it- appear that the 
Wheelwright Construction Company was the agent of 
the City, but on the contrary the pleading, with no state-
ment to the contrary, is that Wheelwright was an 
independent contractor. Such indeed is the fact. 
The asserted liability of the city can therefore be 
based only upon the theory that it allowed a dangerous 
condition to continue ~fter actual or constructive notice 
thereof and reasonable opportunity to correct the defect. 
This court has held in substance that a municipality is 
not liable for injury for failure to exercise ordinary care 
to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition 
unless it had actual or constructive notice of the defect 
and an opportunity to correct the same. 
Jensen vs. Logan City 
89 Utah 347; 57 Pac. 2nd 708. 
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Such is the general rule. See 
19 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 
3rd Ed., Section 54.102. 
In the case of 
~Iorris vs. Salt Lake City 
35 Utah 474, 101 Pac. 373, 
the court held the City liable for damages resulting from 
a dangerous condition in the street only because it was 
determined as a fact that the city's inspector was present 
and had an opportunity to see the dangerous condition 
and that more than four days had elapsed after the 
creation of the condition and before the accident so that 
the city was held to have notice. 
In this case the condition complained of had existed 
only a matter of hours and there is nothing in the 
pleadings or in the opening statement of the appellant 
to show that the City had either actual or constructive 
notice or any opportunity to correct the situation. Thus, 
even if it should be held that the situation in front of 
the ~filler home negligently created a hazardous con-
dition with respect to the appellant, still the City would 
not be liable therefor and the order appealed from was 
properly entered as to the City and should be affirmed. 
POINT 3. The alleged negligence of the defendants 
was not the proximate cause of appellant's injuries. 
There are really two phases of this point : (a) The 
accident was not caused by either of the alleged acts 
of negligence, but by the natural crumbling of the lip 
of the freshly dug trench under appellant's added weight, 
17 
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a phenomenon frequently encountered in new excava-
tions; and (b) the acts of the appellant himself in 
scrambling over the barricade into the closed portion 
of the street, and attempting to cross the new trench in 
the dark and in placing his full weight on the brink 
thereof, constitute a distinct, successive, unrelated and 
effecient intervening cause of the accident. 
It is, of course, a fundamental principle of the law 
of torts that even if negligence were conceded to exist, 
which here it is not, if there is an intervening efficient 
cause, no liability against the person originally negligent 
can be predicated. As stated in 
65 CJS, Page 685, 
"An intervening cause which breaks the chain 
of causation from the original negligent act or 
my.ission will be regarded as the proximate 
cause relieving the original wrongdoer of 
liability." 
And in 
65 CJS, Page 693, 
it is said, 
"Liability cannot be predicated on a prior 
and remote cause which merely furnishes the 
condition or occasion for an injury resulting from 
an intervening unrelated and efficient cause, even 
though the injury would not have resulted but 
for such condition or occasion." 
These rules are so fundamental and so well known 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this case the alleged negligence was first the 
failure to provide a crossing for appellant at his front 
door so that he could without any inconvenience cross 
the closed portion of the street and second, the failure 
to light the locality of the closed portion of the street 
by his front door so that he could safely cross the barrier 
and the closed portion of the street without danger or 
injury. It must, however, be noticed from the opening 
staten1ent of the appellant that the accident happened 
when the appellant stood astraddle of the trench with 
one foot upon either lip thereof and one lip of the trench 
caved in under his added weight, allowing him to fall. 
Obviously here it could not be anticipated by any 
reasonable prudent man that the appellant would wrong-
fully attempt to cross the street under dark and danger-
ous conditions, as he himself claims, and that he would 
plant his full weight upon the immediate lip of the 
trench. Obviously, the real cause of the accident was 
the act of the appellant in pushing his weight upon the 
lip of the freshly dug trench. It is a matter of common 
human knowledge that freshly dug trenches with vertical 
sides tend to cave in whenever any additional pressure 
is placed upon the lip, and indeed they are frequently 
subject to caving even without the addition of extra 
weight or pressure. This is a matter of common know-
ledge which every reasonable prudent man must contem-
plate. It is very clear that it was not the lack of light 
or the failure to provide adequate crossings which were 
the proximate causes of the accident; it was the act of 
the appellant in adding his weight to the lip of the 
freshly dug trench. Obviously there was sufficient 
light to enable him to locate the trench and to find his 
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way over the barrier and the caving in of the lip of the 
trench was something that would have happened as well 
in daylight as in the dark under the conditions pro-
vailing here. It was the appellant's own act which 
was the proximate cause of the accident and the acts 
of the defendants, if any, at most merely furnished 
the condition or occasion for the injury resulting from 
intervening unrelated and efficient cause which was 
the appellant's act in exerting additional pressure on 
the lip of the trench. 
In this connection it perhaps should be observed 
that the appellant was not in the exercise of any right 
in attempting to cross the trench at this particular 
time. As has heretofore been demonstrated, the city 
and its contractor had the right to close the portion 
of the trench involved in the public works construction 
and when so closed and by the barricade marked with 
a light at the end thereof the appellant's right to the 
use of that portion of the street ceased and in attempt-
ing to use it he was acting wrongfully and was in 
effect a trespasser. It was his duty to go around the 
ends of the trench which he could have done by going 
eastward to the end of the trench at the alleyway just 
west of Washington Boulevard, less than a half a 
block away or westward around the west end of the 
trench at Grant A venue which was less than half a 
block from his front door. 
It seems so very clear that reasonable minds could 
not differ in holding that the accident was caused by 
the appellant's act in unlawfully proceeding across a 
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closed portion of the street in the face of known dan-
gers and established warnings and barricades. It was 
not caused by any negligence of either defendant here 
and the order dismissing the complaint was properly 
entered and should be affirmed. 
POINT 4. The stated facts affirmatively show 
that plaintiff voluntarily attempted to cross the trench 
in the face of dangers of which he knew or should have 
known and assumed the risk of injury therefrom within 
the meaning of the doctrine "volenti non fit injuria." 
The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" liberally trans-
lated, means that to which a person assents is not 
deemed in law to be a legal injury. See 
44 Words and Phrases, 
Permanent Edition, 
368, et seq. 
The doctrine of assumption of risk is one phase of 
the application of the legal maxim volenti non fit injuria. 
During the early development of the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk it was sometimes said to apply only where 
the relationship of the employer and employee obtained, 
whereas the broader aspects of the maxim applied to 
cases where there was no such relationship. It appears 
now, however, that this nice distinction has broken down 
and that the convenient and descriptive phrase "as-
sumption of risk" is applied substantially to all cases 
where the maxim would apply. 
In cases such as this the doctrine of assumption 
of risk in its broader aspects and the doctrine of contri-
butory negligence frequently overlap and are not in-
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frequently confused by the courts. Under some facts 
both defenses are applicable. Such we believe to be 
the case here. 
The various doctrines of contributory negligence, 
assumption of risk, volenti non fit injuria are carefully 
defined and distinguished and apply with outstanding 
logic and clarity in the case of 
Walsh vs. West Coast Mines 
. (Washington, 1948) 
197 Pac. 2nd 233. 
That case is of particular interest here because it 
involves a case of a cave-in in a mine into which the 
plaintiff entered after a prior cave-in knowing that a 
subsequent cave-in would not be at all unlikely. The 
court there comments that there are many cases in 
which assumption of risk or the doctrine of volenti 
non fit injuria may bar recovery even though the injured 
person might be free from contributory negligence. 
In that case the plaintiff was a Govern1nent mine in-
spector and had no contractual relation with the owner 
of the mine in which he received his injuries. 
The distinction between the doctrines of contribu-
tory negligence, of volenti non fit injuria and assump-
tion of risk are also carefully considered and analyzed in 
Volume 65 Harvard Law Review, 
Page 623, 
in which the rather recent Federal case of 
Swift & Company vs. Schuster 
192 Fed. 2nd 615, 
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is rather stringently criticized by Dr. Warren Seavey, 
Bussey Professor of Law at Harvard Law School be-
cause the majority opinion in that case failed to appre-
ciate and properly apply the doctrine of assumption 
of risk in its various ramifications. In the case there 
considered by the learned commentator a Government 
inspector in a packing plant had stepped down from a 
twenty-three inch high platform onto a floor, which was 
necessarily wet and slippery because of the nature of 
the business, instead of going around by another way 
down where there were provided hand holds to steady 
him. ~e slipped, fell and was injured. The commen-
tator says that in that case it appears clear that there 
was no jury question. 
Again in the case of 
Southern Pacific Company 
vs. McCready 
47 Fed. 2nd 673, 676, 
it is said that the doctrine of assumption of risk in the 
broader sense may apply when no relation by contract 
exists within the limits of the maxim "volenti non fit 
injuria." If one knowing and comprehending the dan-
ger, voluntarily exposes himself to it, though not negli-
gent in so doing, he is deemed to have assumed the risk 
and is precluded from a recovery for an injury result-
ing therefrom. And in the case of 
LaPorte vs. Houston 
189 Pac. 2nd 544, 
it was held that if an injured person has the knowledge 
or means of knowledge of exist~nce of a danger, or if 
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the danger is obvious, he assumes the risk of such danger 
when he places himself in a position where it might 
strike, and he cannot recover if injury results. 
In this case the Appellant obviously knew of the 
danger for he stopped to look the situtation over be-
fore proceeding and then voluntarily decided to proceed 
in the face thereof. Moreover, as has been before 
suggested, the danger of the lip of a freshly dug trench 
caving in under additional weight is obvious and is 
common knowledge, with which all persons of ordinary 
mentality must be charged. 
In the case of 
Dingman vs. A. F. Mattock 
96 Pac. 2nd 821 ; 
104 Pac. 2nd 26, 
the California Court of Appeals held that a subcon-
tractQr who sustained injuries when a scantling which 
had been placed across an open stairway broke as he 
sought to ascend thereby from one level to another was 
barred by assumption of risk, as well as by contribu-
butory negligence, from recovering from the general con-
tractor for his injuries. Here is a case much like the 
one before the court where the injured party assumed 
the risk of the insufficiency of the footing chosen by 
him to sustain his weight. 
The Iowa Supreme Court in the case of 
Gowing vs. Henry Field C01npany 
281 N. W. 281 
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held that an independent plumbing contractor attempt-
ing to step off a roof over a balustrads sixteen inches 
high and twelve inches wide onto a fire escape, which 
had no railing, and who fell, assumed the risk entailed 
by such conduct as a matter of law. This case again 
is very much like the case at bar in that it involves an 
atten1pt by the injured person to step across a situ-
ation in which the dangers are patent and obvious. The 
Massachusetts Court in the case of 
Engel vs. Boston Ice Company 
4 N. E. 2nd 455, 
held that the principle of assumption of risk involved 
where a servant who knows that proper precautions 
have been neglected by his master, and still knowingly 
consents to proceed in the face of the risk to which he will 
be exposed, and that his assent dispenses with the duty 
of the master as to such risk applies with equal force to 
the employee of a subcontractor of an independent con-
tractor constructing an ice plant for the ice company. 
Again it was held in the case of 
Regenbogen vs. Southern Shipwrecking 
Corporation 
41 Southern 2nd 110, 
that even an invitee assumes all normal and ordinary 
risks attendant upon the use of the premises wherein he 
enters, and that the owner is not liable for injury to the 
invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or 
which should have been observed in the exercise of 
ordinary care. A case particularly applicable here, in 
view of the appellant's opening statement to the effect 
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that he voluntarily chose to cross the closed portion of 
the street in the face of the dangers there apparent as 
against the alternative course of going around the ends 
of the trench a distance of a few yards, in the case of 
Hall vs. Ziegler 
64 Atl. 2nd 767, 
decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1949. 
That court there held that where a person choses a place 
of danger in preference to one of comparative safety, 
and by reason of his choice is injured, his own act 
amounts to an "assumption of risk" and he cannot re-
cover. In this case the appellant could when he became 
aware of the trench as he entered 18th Street have 
there parked his car and walked up the sidewalk on 
the north side of the street for the purpose of entering 
his home. An ordinary prudent man would have chosen 
this absolutely safe course as against the dangerous 
alternative of clambering over the barricading pile of 
dirt and attempting to cross the trench in the closed 
portion of the street. When the appellant here chose 
the dangerous as against the safe course, he assumed 
all risks incident to the former and cannot recover for 
his injuries suffered in the course of pursuing the 
dangerous course. 
The case of 
LaPorte vs. Houston, supra, · 
is worthy of a little further consideration at this point. 
In that case the injured party brought his automobile, 
which had not been behaving properly, to the defendant's 
garage for a checkup. He stood in front of the car 
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while the engine was running as the defendant mechanic 
worked over the car in checking it. The car suddenly 
and inexplicably jumped forward and struck the injured 
plaintiff. The California Court there said: 
~·rf the plaintiff has knowledge or the means 
of knowledge of the existence of a danger, or if 
the danger is obvious, he assumes such danger 
when he places himself in a position where it 
might strike .... conceding that appellant (the 
plaintiff) did not know of the danger that his 
gear lever would automatically jump from the 
neutral slot to the drive slot as he testified, by 
what mode of reasoning can he obviate the con-
sequences of the danger of standing in front of 
his car parked frontwards on a declevity and 
undergoing a test. He was there on the advice or 
suggestion of another. If either party then had 
means of knowledge of the peril there was 
apparent .... with such knowledge available 
he should have sought a place of safety out of 
bounds of the car's jump. By standing in front 
of it he assumed the dangers inherent in his own 
internally defective machine." (Emphasis added). 
The principle there enunciated is directly applicable 
here for the appellant here voluntarily chose to stand on 
the lip of the trench and assumed the risk of its unex-
pectedly crumbling away from under him, 
The case of 
Buckingham vs. Commary-Peterson 
Company 
178 Pac. 318 
(California District Court of Appeal, Re-
hearing Denied by Supreme Court Feb-
ruary 10, 1919), 
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involves an accident on a road in which a public works 
project was in process. The road itself was under re-
construction. The plaintiff there lived in the vicinity 
and knew that the road had been torn up in the course 
of reconstruction. He complained that there were no 
barriers or lights to protect him from driving his auto-
mobile into a certain open culvert crossing over the 
travelled portion of the highway. The court said: 
"With the knowledge which the plaintiff had 
of the condition of the highway over which he 
attempted to make his way to Suisun, it is, as 
above stated, a matter of no material importance 
whether the barriers were maintained across the 
road or lights kept at points where there were 
obstructions caused by the tearing up of the 
road or the piling thereon of materials to be 
used in the work of construction. Barriers and 
lights and such other warnings placed on streets 
or highways which are undergoing construction 
or improvement are for those of the traveling 
public who have no knowledge or previous notice 
of the conditions which render the thoroughfare 
unsafe to use. Therefore, those having actual 
knowledge of the existence of such unsafe con-
ditions, or who, having had such knowledge, 
attempt to use the street or highway without first 
informing themselves as to whether such condi-
tions have been removed and the highway thus 
made suitable and safe for general use, do so at 
their own peril." (Emphasis added.) 
The California Court there quotes with approval from 
the case of 
Compton vs. Revere 
179 Mass. 413 
60 N. E. 931 
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in which the ~fassachusetts Court said: 
"It is obvious that the plaintiff knew all that 
there was to know about the condition of things, 
and in attempting to use the street, did at his 
peril ..... Nor do we regard it as material that 
prior to the accident some wagons were driven 
over the streets. There are always persons who 
take risks, if a shortcut can be made, and who 
will go over a street even if it is obviously not 
open to public travel." (Emphasis added.) 
The court in the Buckingham case also quotes with 
approval from the West Virginia case of 
Shriver vs. Marion County Court 
66 S. E. 1062, 26 LRA (N. S.) 377: 
"The liberty, right and power of the citizen 
in respect to the use of highways being very 
broad, it is neither unreasonable nor unjust to 
require him to avail himself of his wide latitude 
of choice, impose upon him the duty to exercise 
reasonable care and prudence, and hold him 
guilty of contributory negligence when by reason 
of his omission thereof, injury results to him or 
his property. As in all other cases arising under 
the law of negligence his voluntary and unneces-
sary encountering of dangers amounts to an 
assumption of risk and bars recovery, if he had 
knowledge of the danger, or by reason of its 
obviousness, he was bound to know it." (Emphasis 
added) 
In the case at bar the appellant was not compelled 
to attempt to cross the closed portion of the street and 
to place his weight upon either lip of the trench while 
straddling it. He had an easy alternative, but he like 
some of the other people to whom the quotations have 
referred supra, preferred to proceed in the face of 
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danger and to take the risk. The appellant could have 
chosen the easy and proper alternative of walking a 
few steps around the end of the trench instead of 
attempting to cross the same at night and in a partic-
ularly dangerous manner, that is, by placing his weight 
on either side for the purpose of helping his wife across. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that the 
appellant appreciated the danger to such an extent that 
he instructed his wife to wait and not to cross the dirt 
barrier until he had satisfied his own liberal ideas 
regarding the risks they were incurring in attempting 
improperly to cross the trench in the closed portion of 
the street. We are not dealing here with a snap judg-
ment taken under stress of any emergency, but with a 
considered weighing of the chances and a voluntary 
and needless assumption of the risk of obvious danger. 
The appellant has no right in law to recover under the 
facts stated and the order appealed from should be 
affirmed for the reasons outlined. 
POINT 5. The stated facts affirmatively show that 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 
It is believed that little more need be said on this 
point. Many of the obervations made and authorities 
cited under the question of assumption of risk are 
equally applicable to the question of the contributory 
negligence of the appellant. We will add only a few 
authorities bearing particularly on this question. 
In the case of 
Cody vs. Boston 
154 N. E. 753, 
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the Massachusetts Court held that a plaintiff injured 
by attempting to cross a street not opened for travel 
was contributory negligent as a matter of law. Again 
the Supreme Court of Arizona in 
City of Glendale vs. Sutter 
95 Pac. 2nd 560, 
held that a plaintiff who was injured when she went to 
dump table scraps in a garbage container in a public 
alley at the rear of her home at night and without a 
light and there stumbled over a cement irrigation box 
maintained by the city, the existence of which she knew, 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law, and that it was error to fail to direct a verdict in 
favor of the defendant city. 
The California Court in 
Buckingham vs. Commary-Peterson 
Company, Supra, 
in addition to holding that the plaintiff there proceeded 
at his own peril upon a closed street, held that in so 
doing the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law and that no jury question was 
involved. 
This court very recently affirmed a judgment of 
non-suit upon the ground of the affirmative appearance 
of contributory negligence in a case quite similar to 
the one at bar. The case is 
Knox vs. Snow 
229 Pac. 2nd 87 4. 
In that case the plaintiff was an invitee in a garage. 
He stepped over a hydraulic hoist which extended about 
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eight inches from the floor and which was a few feet 
from the grease pit and continued on toward the tire 
rack upon which his attention was centered. He stopped 
his left foot resting on or near the rim of the pit. After 
standing there a moment he shifted his weight from one 
foot to another and in doing so his left foot slipped, he 
lost his balance and fell into the well. In grasping at 
a ladder to save himself he suffered the injuries for 
which he sought recovery. This court held that he was 
properly ruled guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law because he knew or reasonably should have 
known of the peril and might have avoided it by the 
exercise of ordinary care. The court commented that 
the plaintiff there neglected to use the care required 
of a prudent man traversing a shop having hazards 
readily discernible even to one with impaired vision 
where the shop was a place of having known dangers. In 
the case at bar the plaintiff is equally guilty of failure 
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. 
It is submitted that the facts before this court 
hardly need the citation of these or any other authorities 
on this point. It seems clear that no reasonable minds 
could differ in holding the appellant here negligent in 
proceeding at night with insufficient lighting to scramble 
across a barrier onto the closed portion of the street 
and thereto to poise his weight on either lip of a nPwl~' 
dug trench was not taking the care for his own safety 
which an ordinary prudent man should do. In this 
connection it must be observed that under the circum-
stances here existing, and contrary to appellant's state-
ment on page 9 of his brief, the appellant had no right 
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to use that portion of the public street where he fell 
and was injured. That portion was closed in the interest 
of the promotion of necessary public works and two 
alternative ways were readily available to him around 
each end of the trench which were less than half a block 
away in either dir8ction. The appellant here willfully 
proceeded in the face of a known danger and risk and 
without regard to his own safety and without any right 
so to do. In so doing he failed to have that care for 
his own safety that an ordinary prudent man under the 
circumstances would have and as a matter of law he 
was guilty of contributory negligence barring recovery. 
In this connection it should also be observed that 
the appellant was under no compulsion to choose this 
dangerous alternative as against the safe alternative. 
As the city and its contractor were within their rights in 
closing and barricading that portion of the street he 
was deprived of no right in being impliedly requested 
temporarily to go around the dangerous trench and he 
was not asked to sacrifice any right which he had in 
foregoing the shortcut which he attempted. He was not 
compelled to forego any legal right in order to take 
reasonable care for his own safety, and in proceeding 
into a dangerous place on the street where he had no 
right to be he was guilty of contributory negligence. 
Under these circumstances the rules stated in the 
American Law Institute Restatement of the 
Law of Torts, Volume 2, Page 1243, 
referred to by appellant on pages 7, 8 and 18, and the 
authorities dealing with the duty of care in the exercise 
by appellant of a legal right are not in point. 
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It is submitted that it is clear from the pleadings 
and the statement of facts that the appellant here was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and 
that the order of dismissal was properly granted and 
should be affirmed. 
POINT 6. The dismissal of appellant's cause does 
not deprive him of his constitutional right of jury trial, 
as the stated facts present no claim on which relief could 
be granted. 
Here again little need be said for appellant's argu-
ments on this score obviously constitute a grasping at 
a straw. It is a universally recognized rule that where, 
as here, the undisputed facts show that the plaintiff is 
not entitled to relief a dismissal by the court does not 
deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional right to jury 
trial. In fact under such circumstances the right to 
jury trial never existed as all lawyers know. This court 
has already passed on that question, and against the 
contention of the appellant here, in the case of 
Raymond vs. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company 
113 Utah 26; 191 Pac. 2nd 137. 
In passing it is interesting to note that the Consti-
tution nowhere guarantees the plaintiff a jury trial 
in a case such as this. The right to a jury trial in a 
civil case in Utah exists if at all by virtue of statute or 
the rules of procedure and not otherwise. See the 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I, Section 10. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is Yery respectfully submitted that under any 
one or all of the considerations herein discussed the 
action of the trial court in dismissing the plaintiff's 
cause was eminently correct and in accordance with law 
and just and should be affirmed. If cities and their 
contractors are to be subjected to liability upon such 
shallow grounds as those here urged, then the munic-
ipalities, which are nationally in dire financial straits, 
as the court will judicially know, will indeed be unable 
to proceed with any construction work in their streets 
for the purpose of supplying their citizens with the 
service for which the municipalities are primarily organ-
ized. To make the city and its contractors here liable 
would be to impose upon them a rule which would make 
them substantially insurers of the safety of all persons 
injured in the public streets even though they be within 
portions of the public streets which are temporarily 
withdrawn from travel. We do not believe that this 
court will impose upon the people any such unfair rule. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER 
Corporation Counsel for Ogden City 
1018 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Respondent Wheelwright 
Construction Company 
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